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Abstract 
 
As the devastating impacts of climate change continue to loom across the 
world, it comes to a surprise then why responses by nation-states have 
been too slow and lacking for a supposed destructive, debilitating and 
critical-to-survival threat. This then negates the rationalist perspectives of 
the states which assume that playing games of survival are what nation-
states do on a day-to-day basis. To that end, this paper proposes an 
alternative explanation, which uses a political-economy approach to 
conclude disconnect between the zero-sum understandings of political -
security perspectives within a liberal-capitalistic world order that thrives 
of positive-sum narratives. This paper shall exclusively use the case of a 
possible universal carbon taxation and the typologies thereof to conclude 
how a political-economy approach should be appropriate for a political-
security end with regards to climate change. 
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1. Introduction 
 
By the time of writing this piece, 
the world held in its hands these grim 
facts. Global fossil fuel emissions as 
measured in GtCo2 (Gigatonnes of 
CO2) have approximately increased 
by 20-percent in the past recorded 
 
 
 
decade with The People’s Republic 
of China (henceforth referred to as 
the PRC) having had the most 
dramatic increase of approximately 
twice its 2005 fossil fuel emissions 
by 2016 (see table 1 for details). 
Another additional grim fact is 
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the apparent rising temperatures of 
which along the 136-year data 
gathered, 17 out of 18 world’s 
warmest year records have been 
occurring since 2001 (NASA, 2017). 
Conveniently then, Greenland and 
the Antartic Ice sheets, which 
accounts for more than 99-percent of 
the world’s freshwater (NSIDC, 
2018), are continuously losing mass 
at 127 Gt/yr and 286 Gt/yr rate 
(Gigatonnes/year) respectively 
(NASA, 2017). This then easily 
translates to the rise of sea levels 
which, conveniently again, have 
risen by more than a 100-percent 
between 2005 and 2017 (NASA, 
2017). Moreover, the previous grim 
facts have then been calculably 
defined to have caused 4.9 million 
yearly deaths in 2010 according to 
the latest Climate Vulnerability 
Monitor report (DARA & CVF, 
2012). The report also predicts, that 
if current patterns of carbon use and 
climate changes continue, the deaths 
could go as far as 6 million yearly 
by 2030. Deaths of which are caused 
by the direct consequences of carbon 
emissions and indirect ones through 
the damaging climate change effects 
(such as disasters, drought, and 
diseases) (DARA & CVF, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Author’s compilation 
from the Global Carbon Atlas 
interactive time series (Global 
Carbon Project, 2017) 
 
Conclusively, should the science 
remain infallible, the grim facts that 
have been presented above are all 
interconnected as man-made climate 
change. Yet, this then begs the 
question as to why the world of 
nation-states have made insignificant 
progress in addressing the issue of 
climate change (as evident by the 
continuous increase of emissions 
globally) despite the overwhelmingly 
evident scientific consensus on the 
devastations man-made climate 
change can and have brought (NASA, 
2017) (Klein, 2014, p. 12)(Klein, 
2014:12). In fact, looking all the way 
back to the first transnational 
environmental cause that have 
produced a successful multilateral 
pledge, i.e. the Montreal Protocol 
which have to this date been deemed a 
success in restoring ozone 
concentrations (Barett, 2009:67), the 
current failings from 
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the Kyoto Protocol onwards shall 
put us on a trajectory as predicted by 
the Climate Vulnerability Monitor. 
Furthermore, being conducted 
within the tenets of the international 
relations (IR) discipline, this paper 
shall question also the supposed 
rationality of the states’ actions and 
responses to the destructive, 
debilitating and critical-to-survival 
threat of climate change. This paper 
shall also establish a priori the 
following premises: a) although the 
main questioning argument of this 
paper begins from a political-
security perspective of which the 
approaches later discussed are to be 
traditional security oriented, this 
paper shall transcend the sub-
disciplines of IR by bringing the 
concept of interests as the lead 
bridging variable to the political-
economy approach, hence b) the 
research of this paper shall for the 
most part use the term (neo)liberal 
as a description of the current state 
of world market-based economic 
affairs (Clapp & Dauvergne, 
2005:239) , not the dominant IR 
neoliberalism and or liberal 
institutionalism of Keohane, Nye 
and others (Lamy, 2011:114), unless 
otherwise stated. In other words, this 
paper contends that climate change 
is not the same kind of force within 
the political-security structures 
 
that shape state action/inaction to 
insecurities (caused by critical -to-
survival threats). It is actually the 
role of political-economic activities 
that fuel the continuous increase in 
threat of climate change impacts 
(therefore fueling insecurities to 
some, as will be explained later), not 
power imbalances or disruptions in 
state affairs. 
 
2. Rationalists Approach within 
 
IR 
 
Realism and its offshoots. Built 
upon the ashes of the Great 
European Wars (i.e. WWI and 
WWII), the realist IR approaches are 
credited to the ideas of Carr, 
Morgenthau and Niebuhr (Dunne & 
Schmidt, 2011:84). The approaches 
of the early realists are based upon 
the assumptions of people’s motives 
at the individual level which then 
translates into state action, and as 
Morgenthau has put it in his well-
known Six Principles of Political 
Realism, the motives of individuals 
are based upon human nature borne 
objective laws which then translates 
into rational human action/ inaction 
(Morgenthau, 1985). The arguments 
of the classical realists were then 
brought upon a higher order of 
analysis by the new realists 
(neorealists), who posits that it was 
not the individual human nature that 
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causes state action/inaction, but the 
international structure of constant 
power and security struggles that 
shape state behavior (Dunne & 
Schmidt, 2011:96). Writing in terms 
of a chronological order, what 
followed was the advent of the new 
classical realists (neoclassical 
realists) started by Gideon Rose 
(1998). The neoclassical realist 
approach brings back the individual 
unit factor as a variable of state 
conduct but at the same time 
acknowledging the power struggle 
structures put forth by neorealists. In 
other words, their approach ‘places 
domestic politics as an intervening 
variable between the distribution of 
power and foreign policy behaviour’ 
(Dunne & Schmidt, 2011:90). Yet, 
with the understanding of a natural 
state of affairs, be it the individual, 
the structures surrounding the state 
or both at the same time, all 
approaches within the realist 
tradition continues upon the path of 
explaining state action/inaction 
through the theory of rational 
choice. The idea of rational choice, 
which draws upon behavioural 
economic studies, presupposes a 
political actor as utility maximizers, 
wherein self-interests dictates said 
actors to accrue as much gains with 
minimal losses (Brown & Ainley, 
2005:31). 
 
 
 
 
 
In effect, as stated by Dunne 
(2011), there is a significant degree 
of continuity along the evolution of 
realist thoughts wherein three core 
elements, known as the 3S (Statism, 
Self-help & Survival) persists 
amongst the various realist 
offshoots. Statism is understood as a 
given due to the anarchic conditions 
of the world, hence the highest order 
of exercised authority is only done 
by states. Self-help is the only 
principle action states adhere to in 
an anarchical world, due to the fact 
that there is no higher order to assist 
their conducts. This is contrasted to 
how states are responsible for the 
individual populations within them. 
Survival is what shapes rational 
action according to realists, the most 
basic instinct of human nature is that 
of staying alive, hence any conducts 
thereof is to satisfy said instinct 
(Dunne & Schmidt, 2011:94). 
 
Liberalism and its offshoots. 
An understanding of liberalism can 
go all the way back to the mid-19th 
century ideas of Richard Cobden, 
who contends that the causes of 
conflict are extensive interventions 
to the idea of individual liberties 
which causes disturbances to the 
natural order of the freedom of 
human conduct. Moreover, the ideas 
of liberalism founded by 
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Woodrow Wilson and J.A. Hobson 
then bring in the democratic nature 
and power balances as variables that, 
if disturbed, shall cause conflict 
(Dunne, 2011:103). It is also 
convenient that the liberal approach is 
in agreement with the realist camp 
that the world state of affairs is 
anarchic with the highest order of 
exercised authority only being done 
by states (Dunne, 2011:103). Unlike, 
the Realist’s perspective with its 
chronologically ordered birth of 
offshoots, the new liberalism 
(neoliberalism) grew out of the 
pluralistic critiques of the realist 
theories (Brown & Ainley, 2005:45). 
The neoliberals or otherwise dubbed 
as liberal institutionalists suggest that 
the way towards peace is for states to 
surrender a portion of their 
sovereignty as evidenced by the 
development of the European Union 
(Lamy, 2011:121). 
 
As complex processes of 
development continued and the 
technological processes brought along 
with it, what became of 
interdependences, wherein state 
conduct are increasingly bind 
together, became the backdrop of 
further neoliberal theories. The 
neoliberals, do accept that anarchy 
exists as well as self-serving interests 
of the states, but due to the complex 
interdependences structured, state 
 
conduct can be done, if not more 
beneficial, in cooperation (Brown 
 
& Ainley, 2005:47). One method of 
cooperative conduct is through 
international regimes, which is 
defined as ‘principles, norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures 
around which actor expectations 
converge in a given issue-area’ 
(Krasner, 1982:185). International 
institutions therefore, serve as a 
platform for said international 
regimes. However, in effect, even 
though the leading variables 
perceived more important by liberals 
differ to those of realists, the two are 
in accordance when both their 
explanation of state action/ inaction 
is based upon rational choice 
conduct (Brown & Ainley, 
2005:47). 
 
3. Rationalist Attempt at 
Climate Change 
 
Considering the proclaimed 
dominance of the rationalist 
approaches as supposed explanatory 
devices to state action/inaction 
within international relations 
conduct (Brown & Ainley, 
2005:32), it is then stressed again 
the apparent disconnect between the 
overwhelming evidence of critical-
to-survival climate change and 
states’ continuous insignificant 
action towards addressing it. Both 
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the realists and liberalists as rational 
theories agree that actions of state 
mainly serve survival instincts. That 
being said, for a realist, an increase of 
perceived threat from another party 
towards a state shall create insecurity 
which then provides an impetus for 
state actions of minimizing said threat 
(in the realist camp, through activities 
such as bandwagoning or balancing) 
(Dunne & Schmidt, 2011:84). Even 
the proclaimed realist argument of 
Morgenthau assumes states behave to 
the point of, for better or for worse, 
immorality which is driven by that 
survivalist instinct (Tickner, 2009:15). 
As for the liberalist, a method of 
averting conflict, or the fear of 
conflict is done through cooperative 
conduct (Dunne, 2011:106). 
Therefore, a formed threat engenders 
a rational response. Rationality, of 
course, is the instinctual guide to 
ensuring survival. However, as 
evident by the continuous process of 
climate change, and in addition to 
that, the severely lacking prescriptions 
borne out of multilateral arrangements 
and state action (Klein, 2014:123), the 
question in mind is then, either the 
states are not rational at all or the 
theories brought forth trying to 
explain that states are rational are 
inappropriate for this issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite the already negated 
rational survival-instinct premise of 
realism vis-à-vis climate change, 
Heffron (2015) make further attempts 
at fitting the realist theoretical lens 
upon climate change action/inaction. 
In Heffron (2015), climate change is 
defined as a global threat that is 
indiscriminate of states and state 
borders. Yet, despite being 
indiscriminate and very real, the 
various strands of realism only 
continue to analize ‘war, conflict, 
geopolitics, alliances and balancing 
behaviours, and the way states operate 
in the international system’ and hence 
‘realism has very little or nothing to 
say about possible solutions to climate 
change’ (Heffron, 2015:8). A 
significant argument put forth in 
Heffron (2015) is the idea of carbon 
bandwagoning as a signifier of states 
action/inaction to climate change. The 
argument follows the idea that as state 
A pursues rational conduct of 
reducing carbon emissions through 
lowering reliance on fossil fuels, 
another state B may ‘bandwagon off 
the back of these efforts and burn 
more fossil fuels’ hence rendering the 
efforts by state A irrelevant in 
addition to the relative losses to state 
A (Heffron, 2015:10). Heffron (2015) 
argues that the relative losses become 
important climate 
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mitigation efforts by state A may not 
bring much immediate benefits that 
would counteract the losses ceded to 
state B—he explains this in terms of 
resource allocations of military 
capabilities wherein, state A may 
reduce resources allocated towards 
the military to increase climate 
mitigation efforts, and the resulting 
behaviour of state B would be taking 
advantage of state A’s dwindling 
down military capability hence 
creating traditional spiral of 
insecurity (security dilemma, see 
Dunne & Schmidt, 2011:95). 
 
The argument of carbon 
bandwagoning posited by Heffron 
(2015), in effect, concludes that state 
inaction towards climate change is 
due to fears that climate change 
action be taken advantage by other 
states hence stimulating a spiral of 
insecurity which then averts all 
attention to the climate issue at the 
beginning. The problem with the 
carbon bandwagoning assumption of 
state inaction is that the realities 
presented do not follow the same 
logic. As presented in Table 1, there 
are actors who have seen reductions 
in fossil fuel emissions amid 
increases by other actors. At the 
same time, the increase of fossil fuel 
emissions by India and the PRC for 
instance is way more than the 
reductions introduced by other 
 
top emitters. Additionally, Kreft et. 
al (2017) and Verisk Maplecroft 
(2016) reports that the PRC and 
India is significantly more at risk to 
the effects of climate change than 
other top emitters. In other words, 
the facts presented at hand further 
disproves the rational arguments 
claim from the realist bandwagoning 
assumption as posited by Heffron 
(2015) because, the PRC and India 
stands to lose much more, and to 
that end is more threatened survival-
wise by climate change (Verisk 
Maplecroft, 2016) (Kreft, et al., 
2017). Moreover, India has actually 
made considerable losses in the year 
2015 due to extreme weathers and 
disasters attributable to climate 
change (Kreft, et al., 2017) in the 
run-up to the Paris Climate Accords, 
which it committed to only slightly 
by the pledge of greenhouse gases 
reductions given (Mizo, 2016:376). 
 
Another realist-originated 
argument have also been proposed 
by Purdon (2017), wherein he 
specifically addresses the action/ 
inaction towards climate change by 
states through the lens of the 
neoclassical realist perspective. In 
Purdon (2017), the neoclassical 
realist thought presented, explains 
that there are ‘systemic concerns on 
climate change cooperation’ due to 
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‘relative-gains concerns associated 
with international resource transfers 
implicit in climate change policy’. 
The resource transfers which this 
paper, in agreement with Purdon 
(2017) and Klein (2014), also 
contends as the most significant 
mode of climate change mitigation, 
pending significant scientific 
breakthrough, then becomes a 
signifier into understanding the 
political forces that shape state 
behaviour. In other words, there are 
conflicting forces domestically in 
addition to the international 
structured forces that compels state 
to act or not to act upon climate 
change (Purdon, 2017:267). Purdon 
(2017), goes further by testing his 
perspective upon the two forms of 
international climate finance: carbon 
markets and climate funds. 
 
In short, the two, supposedly 
forms of resource transfers and 
trading mechanism are built upon 
the bedrock of the neoliberal 
economic order (Purdon, 2017:269). 
The international structures then 
shape state behaviour by tapping the 
relative gains concerns as balance 
and or security have been disturbed 
by the significant resource transfers, 
similar to the argument made in 
Heffron (2015). This is evident in 
Canada’s decision 
 
 
 
 
 
to withdraw from the Kyoto 
Protocol which gave birth to the 
Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), the initial multilateral 
carbon market, due to the notable 
systematic wealth transfers away 
from Canada the mechanism entails 
(Purdon, 2017:281). As for climate 
funds being, straightforwardly, a 
form of wealth transfers, the 
realities presented has been self-
evident with financing pledges not 
always materialized into deposits 
and the number of countries actually 
engaging in climate funds is much 
lower than those active in the carbon 
markets (Purdon, 2017:282). In 
addition to that, as domestic politics 
also shape state behaviour, the 
neoclassical realist perspective 
contends that the popularity of 
carbon markets is due to the 
perceived ability of continued gains 
from taking advantage of the CDM 
and others (such as the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme) by 
domestic actors, and that 
disengagement is a path taken once 
the carbon markets appeal no-longer 
to the self-interested actors within 
the state. The example of 
disengagement is evident by Canada 
again, in its critique towards the 
carbon market as essentially a 
potential waste taxpayers’ money, 
which is a domestic actor concern, 
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particularly political constituencies 
(Purdon, 2017:281). 
 
Yet, despite the compelling case 
presented with carbon markets and 
climate funds by Purdon (2017) that 
can be analyzed through the 
neoclassical realist lens, the relative 
gains concern from disturbances 
within international structures have 
been presented before by Heffron 
(2015), and hence can still be 
dispelled using the same arguments 
proposed previously with continuous 
reductions of emissions by specific 
emitters and the vulnerability 
positions that other specific emitters 
are in. Should attention be given 
then, to the domestic politics, which 
constitutes of various overlapping 
and conflicting self-interests, which 
shape state behaviour, the simple 
rationalist survival-instinct premise 
already negates this argument as 
overwhelming evidence of threat 
continuously presents itself amid 
significant state inaction at the same 
time. This paper shall also concur 
that the neoclassical realist approach 
in itself is inherently problematic as, 
Quinn (2013) concludes. As the 
approach, in its attempt to develop 
 
a law-like explanation of state 
behaviour actually goes beyond the 
limits of the rational aspect of the 
realist paradigm as well as sidelining, 
 
though not completely, the 
systemic imperatives of structural 
realism (Quinn, 2013:160). 
 
What then, can be made of the 
liberalist approach to explaining 
significant state inaction towards 
climate change is just as straight 
forward. As the rational argument 
have been completely dispelled, we 
can also consider how states have 
yet made significant action, even 
cooperatively, in that manner to 
mitigate climate change and hence 
maintain survivalist security (Clapp 
 
& Dauvergne, 2005:249). Hence, 
even as liberal institutionalists make 
an attempt to justify states tendency 
to push for cooperation based on so 
called ‘absolute-gains’ and that they 
shall stand to lose to the impacts of 
climate change if they do not do so 
(Clapp & Dauvergne, 2005:252), the 
facts of current cooperative 
arrangements are considerably 
lacking in both progress and effect 
(Klein, 2014:123). For the most part, 
explanations given by 
institutionalists, according to Clapp 
and Dauvergne (2005) only refer to 
the symptoms of state action/ 
inaction and that improving 
institutional mechanisms, coor- 
dinating platforms and regimes will 
give birth to climate change 
mitigating solutions. The criticism 
then, is how strong the institutions, 
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regimes or coordinating platform 
must become is a never- ending 
goalpost shifting by the insti- 
tutionalists, as the current state of 
institutions should be enough for 
coordinating measures to act 
against climate change (Clapp & 
Dauvergne, 2005:241). 
 
To further argue against the 
institutionalist approach, one can look 
at declaration at the Copenhagen 
Climate Change 2009 conference 
wherein, the scientific consensus of 
the dangers of a 2-degree Celsius 
average temperature rise, which was 
determined all the way back prior to 
the Kyoto Protocol, was formally 
recognized. Yet, despite the scientific 
warning of the temperature rise, it was 
only by the Paris Agreement of 2015 
that the 2- degree Celsius global 
temperature target gained legal 
recognition in the form of an adhered 
to international treaty (Gao, et. al., 
2017:274). Of course, the 2 -degree 
Celsius target was never a 
considerably sufficient target to revert 
or at least fight back climate change as 
evident by the death-sentence still 
given to significant coastline 
populations across the world with sea-
level rises (Gao, et. al., 2017:273) 
(Jex, 2015) . Which then is the reason, 
that a more scientifically safe level of 
1.5-degree Celsius average 
temperature rise 
 
 
 
 
 
is thrown into the mix within the 
Paris Agreement of 2015 albeit the 
2-degree Celsius target, which is 
more politically convenient, gaining 
the spotlight (Gao, et. al., 
2017:274). So in effect, the 
international realm is not necessarily 
lacking in comprehensive 
institutional structures, it is just that 
the states which cede power to them 
is signi-ficantly not acting enough 
on purpose despite the scientific 
consensus (Klein, 2014:20). 
 
4. Climate Change and the 
Dualistic Ideologues 
 
To wrap up the rationalist camp 
attempts at climate change, the 
theories they’ve proposed only go as 
far as explain how and what of state 
action/inaction towards climate 
change, rather than why. So, even if 
one presupposes the preordained 
games of survival that the 
rationalists claim states are primed 
to go about naturally (Brown 
 
& Ainley, 2005:91), the presented 
facts and realities show that there 
remains significant inaction that 
would otherwise prove rationality. 
The explanation this paper proposes 
then, is through the constructivist 
paradigm, where one point of 
critique is towards said assumptions 
of a preordained rationality within a 
conditioned system that prompt 
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survivalist instincts. In short, states 
are not inherently primed towards 
survival, as rationalists may claim. 
On the contrary, the ideas that define 
them are what determine their 
subjective perception of rationality 
(Brown & Ainley, 2005:112). The 
constructivist approach, being post-
positivist in method, goes beyond 
the stringent empirical methods of 
positivists, which, within the realm 
of IR is embraced by the rationalists 
who establish law-like 
generalizations based on 
quantifiable material capabilities of 
the states (Parsons, 2015:510) 
 
Following upon Cho (2012) who 
states that ‘insecurities themselves are 
not pre- given and natural things 
which exist separately, but are 
produced in a mutually constitutive 
process’, the idea of climate change 
acting as a threat to survival depends 
much upon the ideologues who 
perceive them. What is perceived as 
insecurity in one state, may not be 
perceived as so in another state. The 
stressing point being the constructed 
perception which is shaped by context 
and ideas (Cho, 2012:309). In other 
words, the perception of security 
completely differs to objective 
rational action towards security. To 
analogize, it is a scientific human 
condition for a flight or fight and 
 
adrenaline-induced response to a 
direct physical threat. Yet, whatever 
built perceptions or unawareness, 
could cover said response from ever 
being catalyzed. This is because to an 
individual never knowing the 
constructs of a gun, being held at gun-
point would most probably translate to 
an irresponsive action unlike the 
individual who knows best the killing 
capability of a gun who would 
probably have their survivalist -
instincts triggered. According to Klein 
(2014), the driving issue that created 
the rift of differing perceptions is the 
advent of neoliberal capitalism, 
specifically the continuously 
deregulated one within an 
international anarchic system. 
Connecting the aforementioned 
arguments to the political-economy 
sphere then brings up a dualistic 
rationality construct wherein 
particular states adherent to rational 
security concerns may engage in 
climate change mitigation (that is, 
through fossil fuel emissions 
reductions as done by EU 28, see 
Tabel 1). Whereas other states such as 
the PRC and India remain adherents to 
the purview of the political-economic 
sphere enhancement (Pan, et. al., 
2009:150) (Joshi & Patel, 2009:171). 
 
Moreover, it must be pointed 
out again that, what is meant 
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by rational security concerns of 
countries such as the EU 28 or the US 
is not the same as assumptions of the 
rational realists who presumed 
inaction towards climate change by 
state A is due to fears of carbon 
bandwagoning by state B, because as 
figured by Pan et. al (2009), the 
emissions of the PRC is a substitute 
for the decreases of emissions in the 
developed world. In short, the 
reductions of emissions by the EU 28 
and the US is done under a 
constructed influence of survivalist 
concerns which then primes climate 
mitigation effort narratives (Cass, 
2007:237) not the rationalist claims of 
inherent survivalist -instincts. This is 
because, as argued previously, current 
state actions still does not compute 
towards effectively trying to actually 
survive (Helm, 2009:16). Going back 
to the previous analogy then, there is 
an obvious difference between a 
triggered survivalist instinct by 
fighting then trying to pull then gun 
away, and turning ones back and 
running away. The latter, of course, 
results in being gunned down anyway, 
though the slightest seconds of 
survival was maintained, this is not 
dissimilar to minimal efforts by the 
EU 28 and the US who have built the 
perception amongst themselves to 
maintain slight seconds of survival 
 
 
 
 
 
instead of putting a permanent end 
to the threat. Actions of the PRC 
and India on the other hand is that of 
bargaining with the one holding the 
gun whose naturally preconditioned 
to always shoot, in other words a 
futile attempt. The naturally 
occurring fact is that once emissions 
are up, the carbons stay for a 
lengthy period (Klein, 2014:204), 
hence subscribing to notions that 
development comes first through 
theories like environmental Kuznets 
Curve presented by neoliberals and 
liberal institutionalists alike (Clapp 
 
& Dauvergne, 2005:91) amounts 
to the analogy presented above and 
shows the apparent disconnect. 
 
In retrospect, the context that 
brought us here is a set of historical 
antecedents which shifted our idea 
of a global commons into a 
commodified private property as 
explained by Max Koch (2012), and 
a societal-value shift that disrupted 
the notions of the collective good as 
explained by Klein (2014). So then, 
to follow upon the argument Riviere 
(2015) who states the contestable 
environmentalist norms that are 
slowly being constructed, this paper 
contends that what is being 
contested is the reigning hegemonic 
construct of blind capitalism. The 
environmentalist norms which 
evidently is gaining ground (Cass, 
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2007:238), is currently still subject 
to perversions of materialistic 
reasons hence the continued lack of 
significant action (Riviere, 2014). In 
addition to that, considering how 
constructed ideas within IR is a 
collective manifestation of the 
citizens within, the varying degree 
of climate change mitigation then 
makes sense as the worship of blind 
capitalism differs from state to state 
(Riviere, 2014:92). Moreover, the 
continuous positive-sum promises 
demonstrated by capitalistic 
expansion fuelling rise of CO 2 
emissions, is not followed by the 
scientific evidence of equal 
availability of carbon-sinks, hence 
zero-sum (as the loss is towards a 
collective global common 
ownership) in reality because there 
can only be so much CO2 emissions 
until a breaking point is reached 
(Koch, 2012:31). In other words, the 
current societal constructs fuels the 
process of accumulation by 
dispossession (Koch, 2012:109). 
 
5. Constructing Prescriptions: 
Carbon Tax dissemination 
 
As significant objective action 
is then required to tackle climate 
change which is perceived as a 
threat in varying degrees due to 
contextual ideologue constructs, 
this paper proposes the idea of 
 
constructing a specific political-
economic idea: i.e. carbon taxation. 
The carbon taxation proposed here is 
not exactly an economic step-by-
step policy prescription, but rather a 
constructed social idea of exchange 
and behaviour shaping that goes 
beyond the bounds of the 
synthesizing capitalist and 
environmentalist norms. The reason 
being that, current prescriptions are 
still bound to the compromises of 
privatization and commodification 
of the global commons, hence ideas 
remain restricted to climate funds 
and carbon markets of which the 
results to this day provide no 
significant cheer as to effect in 
reverting climate change (Hepburn, 
2009:377). In fact, the current 
market-based constructed approach, 
rather than social-approaches to 
climate change is so perverted that 
once the carbon markets were 
introduced, accumulative behaviour 
took place more significantly as 
speculations and price manipulations 
became the norm of the carbon 
market instead of fulfilling an 
environmentally clean end (Koch, 
2012:104). 
 
In terms of effect, by introducing 
a social-policy like carbon tax, there 
will be a reshaping of consumption 
patterns on the household side and a 
limitation on negative externalities 
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of productions, both of which would 
then translate to a reduction of overall 
emissions (Mankiw, 2009:373). Yet, 
at the same time, in no way shape or 
form does this paper try to propose 
the introduction of carbon taxes as a 
compromising tool that would be 
politically salient as to promise and or 
maintain economic growth. On the 
contrary, as established throughout 
the entirety of this paper, what needs 
to be introduced are mechanisms that 
would completely revert the damage 
that has been done by irrational 
ideologues towards the global 
commons, i.e. carbon sinks (Klein, 
2014:18). Needless to say, the 
proposed carbon taxes is a radical-free 
alternative approach to extreme 
environmentalists who would 
otherwise promote revolutions or 
taking down current structures 
instantaneously so as to save the 
environment (Clapp & Dauvergne, 
2005:252). The premise of this social 
carbon tax approach for a security 
end, i.e. survival is that taxation is a 
method that stays within the tenets of 
current constructed political-
economic ideologies but is also 
contesting it at the same time. In 
effect, through carbon taxes, the idea 
of profit accumulation and endless 
growth supported by positive-sum 
narratives must be slowly hold back 
 
 
 
 
 
enough to level with the scientific 
consensus of carbon sink capacities 
(Klein, 2014:18). That being said, 
this paper presents three main types 
of carbon taxes that could be 
employed domestically, best suited 
to the context of country resource 
utilization as well as patterns of 
emission. 
 
 Sectoral Carbon Tax. This type 
of carbon tax, shall place the 
burden of emissions negativities 
particularly on those sectors that 
most produce emissions, 
provided that there would be no 
significant factored leakages 
(Baylis, et al., 2013). Leakages, 
according to Baylis et. al (2013) 
is when reductions of emissions 
in one sector shall trigger a shift 
of the emissions elsewhere. The 
example to this is the taxation 
done to the electricity, cement 
and some manufacturing sectors 
within the EU, the resulting end 
of which do not increase 
emissions elsewhere (Baylis, et. 
al., 2013:337).

 Border Carbon Adjustments 
(BCA). Otherwise termed 
Border Tax Adjustments, is a 
taxation method that assures 
‘emissions reductions achieved 
within a country through a tax 
(production tax) are not totally 
offset by the increase
Ardhi Arsala Rahmani 
297 The Shortcomings of Rationalist Claims: Carbon Taxation and Political-Economy 
 
 
in emissions that occurs in 
partner countries by virtue of 
expanded trade’ (Matoo, et. 
al., 2013:588). In short, BCAs 
ensure that the conditions of 
emission freeriding do not 
occur (as explained with the 
PRC offsetting emissions 
reductions of the developed 
world in part three). 
 
 Fossil Fuel Tax (Energy Tax). 
This tax, as the name suggests, 
aims at one of the core of 
emissions itself. Countries 
would tax the fossil fuel use and 
production within their borders 
(McLure Jr., 2014:553). The 
general application of this goes 
by targeting content rather than 
simply usage and or production. 
Which means that the more 
harmful substance would have 
its usage reduced (OECD, 
2016:15).
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Supposing that there are states 
A and B living in an anarchic 
international system. State A decides 
to increase its material capability (be 
it economic or military) so it 
becomes twice that of state B. Not 
long after, state B increases its 
material capability to level. What 
the rational realists see is insecurity 
of state B and the need 
 
to ensure its survival prompting it 
to buildup. The liberalist on the 
other hand, firstly blames the lack 
of coordination between the states 
because state B’s increase of 
material capability to level is due 
to unavailable assurances by state 
A through bridging institutions that 
the increase of material capability 
was not for harms use. The 
constructivist paradigm, 
subscribed by this paper, would 
question what other states C, D 
and E are doing, which presumable 
are not generalized as state B’s 
action, provided that the context of 
ideas shaping action within these 
states differ. Yet what if state A is 
changed into a global common and 
its increase in material capabilities 
is climate change? Well, the logic 
of the rationalists then dictates that 
there are no two-ways to go about 
it, and changing behaviour 
(through patterns of emissions) is 
the only way to go about reducing 
climate change’s potential harm. 
But that is not what has happened. 
 
The arguments brought forth 
in this paper, however, is not an 
attempt to completely dismiss the 
rationalist arguments. In fact, had 
we live in a rationalist world, there 
would have been many significant 
progress towards climate change 
mitigation right now, or 
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perhaps none of its harms have 
come forth. Instead, the current 
world constructs is populated by 
irrational ideologues, and a shift of 
ideas is needed more than ever if 
we are to survive. Perhaps best if 
policies, prescriptions and the likes 
subscribe to the ideas of a global 
commons under tragedy (Hardin, 
1968:1247). Yet, subscribing to 
the constructivist paradigm means 
accepting a pluralistic realm of the 
IR discipline because even ideas 
are shaped by ideas, hence any 
further discussions on this paper’s 
outcome is most welcome. 
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